SAÍDA DO EURO – SEGUNDA RESPOSTA DE DOMENICO MARIO NUTI (VERSÃO INGLESA)

Formulação da pergunta por Júlio Marques Mota

À pergunta formulada

Eis pois a questão que levanto aqui e agora,  uma vez que Portugal se recusa viver em autarcia como um país pequeno que é,   uma vez que a saída da zona euro unilateral é também ela inaceitável, uma vez que a saída apoiada pela UE é, por seu lado, impraticável, e tendo ainda em conta o conjunto,  caracterizado pela ignorância, ganância e maldade,  destes que nos governam,  seja  a nível regional seja  a nível nacional, então o que fazer para não se morrer, mesmo que lentamente (!)  com estas políticas que estão e estão mesmo para durar e  talvez mais de dez anos, de acordo com as declarações de Jens Weidmann ao Wall Street Journal 

continuemos a ver a troca de pontos de vistas havida com Domenico Mario Nuti

À publicação da versão inglesa do texto, seguir-se-à a versão em português e, por fim, a versão em italiano.

The Euroarea: Premature, Diminished, Divergent

By D. Mario NUTI, Professor Emeritus, Sapienza University of Rome, dmarionuti@gmail.comWebsitehttp://sites.google.com/site/dmarionuti/Home  Blog “Transition”: http://dmarionuti.blogspot.com/.

Domenico Mario Nuti
Domenico Mario Nuti

Parte V

(CONCLUSÃO)

6.   “If I wanted to go to Rome I would not start from here”

Clearly if one had wanted to construct a Common Currency Area one should have not proceeded in the way that was followed by the EMU, and certainly would not wish to start from the current state of affairs in the Euroarea.  But starting from here perhaps the best course is to press on as far and as fast as the limited consensus among members will take the weaker and more vulnerable members, towards filling in the missing elements: building some kind of Banking Union; supporting ECB progress towards a de facto proper Central Bank; sustaining political integration and fiscal integration, raising the size of the European Budget; trying to re-launch European investment initiatives and funding European instead of national debt.

To these purposes it would be expedient to threaten an exit vigorously and increasingly rather than actually leaving the Euroarea.  At the same time a country could, still remaining in the Euroarea, and if democratic institutions were sufficiently robust, mimic with internal devaluation the effects of an external devaluation that leaving the Euroarea would allow – but only if this is regarded as essential to re-launch growth.

***

About last paragraph of Nuti text: here I present several personal comments and the replies from Nuti that  are  introduced  by the letters  DMN

Júlio Marques Mota

Nuti says:

To these purposes it would be expedient to threaten an exit vigorously and increasingly rather than actually leaving the Euroarea.  At the same time a country could, still remaining in the Euroarea, and if democratic institutions were sufficiently robust, mimic with internal devaluation the effects of an external devaluation that leaving the Euroarea would allow – but only if this is regarded as essential to re-launch growth.

My comments about this paragraph .

1.  Domenico Mario Nuti says:

– To these purposes it would be expedient to threaten an exit vigorously and increasingly rather than actually leaving the Euroarea.

My comments.

But if it threatens or the threat is credible and then we need go out of the euro, what exactly we also said Jacques Genereux, (in the book we can) when he says:

“Let me be very clear on this subject. The Government that engages in this subversive strategy should be prepared to get out of the euro if necessary, and let know.” ( My translation. The text of Genereux-« Que les choses soient très claires  à ce sujet. Le gouvernement que s’ engage  dans cette  stratégie subversive  doit être préparé à sortir de l’euro si nécessaire, et le faire savoir »  )

However, otherwise, if the threat is not credible so  it will  be without value.

In my mind,  If we go in this position to confront the European Commission must be prepared to get out of the euro.

In your statement your position is not clear.

Reply from Domenico Mario Nuti:

I understand now.  But consider that Mr Cameron has been threatening that the UK might leave the Union  but he is not sure whether he wants to, or whether the planned referendum will endorse a EU exit.  But just taking this stance he has succeeded in obtaining for the first time in the history of the Union a reduction in the absolute size of the budget.  I cannot agree that a threat can only have some positive effect if it is associated with a firm and visible capability to follow up the threat with its implementation.

2.  Second period in this paragraph. Domenico Mario Nuti  says:

– At the same time a country could, still remaining in the Euroarea, and if democratic institutions were sufficiently robust

My comments :

You talk here about are of robust democratic institutions. Here, what is that mean robust institutions? And these institutions are the European institutions or institutions of a country that does not accept this European policy?

Reply from Domenico Mario Nuti :

 I am talking of the country’s institutions. And I mean sufficiently participatory and democratic institutions such that if the government chooses the course of internal devaluation that course has been considered and endorsed by the population sufficiently to be generally acceptable.  You are not suggesting that an external devaluation following the exit from the euro would not involve a fall in real wages and living standards, do you? This is how devaluation works, whether internal or external.

3. Still, In this period you say:

– mimic with internal devaluation the effects of an external devaluation

My comment :

Okay, but in this case you agree the internal devaluation, the policy imposed by the Commission!

Of course, I think that we do not want to say here these position and the problem is in the two words are to the standing of this sentence, that is, the meaning of in this case that I myself wrote. Obviously explain the words in this case will be the answer I ask you in points 1. and the point 2.

Reply from DMN :

Well, I am not recommending internal devaluation unconditionally. What I am saying is that, if you do not intend to devalue after leaving the euro, the case for leaving the euro becomes all that much weaker.  (And leaving the euro would soon involve leaving the Union, which I reckon would be an immeasurable cost). And if you do intend to devalue after leaving the euro you might consider the alternative of staying in the Euroarea and the Union and undertaking an internal devaluation, as long as strong democratic institutions are there to back this policy, which is certainly controversial.

And to finish:

I believe that the text will be richer with your clarification to my questions. Very friendly

Júlio Marques Mota

Reply of DMN : Please feel free to modify my text in line with these clarifications. I look forward to seeing what you make of it.  With warmest good wishes and many thanks for your support and good work. Yours, Mario

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