Selecção e tradução de Júlio Marques Mota
Banca nº 10
(conclusão)
Um mercado será um clube?
Para um economista ingénuo (eu, por exemplo), um preço de mercado é determinado pelo confronto, realizado por um criador de mercado, entre a oferta e a procura. Os financiadores, credores, em euros a três meses enviam as suas ofertas, os mutuários enviam o que pretendem como empréstimos, a sua procura, uma taxa de equilíbrio é anunciada. Manipular o mercado, portanto, exigiria uma operação bastante sofisticada, que envolve muito dinheiro.
Todas as manhãs, às 10 h 40, 18 bancos internacionais (porque eles?) informam sobre a taxa à qual eles pensam poder contrair empréstimos nesse mesmo dia. A BBA faz uma pequena média de tudo isto, depois de ter eliminado as quatro taxas mais altas e as quatro mais baixas… Exactamente, de acordo com o BBA, os bancos seleccionados porque se considera que estes são os mais activos no mercado, respondem à seguinte pergunta: “qual é a taxa que poderia levantar fundos, a que iria contrair empréstimos, se precisasse de o fazer, solicitando e depois aceitando as ofertas interbancárias num mercado de dimensão razoável exactamente antes das 11 da manhã?”
Esta pergunta é de tal modo extraordinária na sua formulação que podemo-nos interrogar realmente como é que um tribunal (e muitas das queixas estão já apresentadas) vai poder julgar seja o que for. Na verdade, não se trata de transacções reais, nem mesmo de promessas de transacções, mas trata-se sim de uma questão puramente hipotética. Por outro lado, o conceito de mercado de tamanho razoável é de uma notável imprecisão. Quando o mercado interbancário é paralisado, como foi o caso e com muita frequência nos últimos anos, esta formulação é um convite para descrever o que deveria ser a taxa interbancária, na indiferença mais total sobre a realidade das forças em presença no mercado. É mais ou menos tão pertinente como se solicitássemos ao Instituto de meteorologia que nos dissesse, tendo em conta que estamos a 20 de Julho como estará o tempo se não houvesse nenhuma especial perturbação climática.
Observe, também, o método usado pelo BBA para estabelecer a sua média: excluir as taxas extremas significa estar a assumir que estas taxas não têm nada para nos dizer, que as eventuais dificuldades no fornecimento de liquidez que antecipariam um grande banco não são informações relevantes a serem incluídas nos preços. Este método de cálculo, portanto, reflecte uma concepção espantosa do que é um preço.
Este caso ilustra de uma maneira bem espectacular a diferença que separa a apresentação do mercado como um conjunto de forças impessoais, objectivas, que produziria veredictos inatacáveis ( o mercado tem sempre razão) e a própria realidade: um clube de banqueiros que fabricam dia a dia e de acordo com os interesses e ao abrigo dos olhares críticos, as regras do jogo que eles vão depois jogar.
Arnaud Parienty, L’affaire du Libor : ce qu’un (énorme) scandale financier nous apprend du fonctionnement des marchés. Alternatives Economiques, disponível em:
alternatives-economiques.fr/
Anexo da UBS extraido de:
UBS, Fourth Quarter 2011 Report, Our financial results for the fourth quarter of 2011.
13. LIBOR
Several government agencies, including the SEC, the US Commodity Futures Trading Commission, the DOJ and the FSA, are conducting investigations regarding submissions with respect to British Bankers’ Association LIBOR rates. We understand that the investigations focus on whether there were improper attempts by UBS (among others), either acting on our own or together with others, to manipulate LIBOR rates at certain times. In addition, the Swiss Competition Commission (WEKO) has announced that it has commenced an investigation of numerous banks and financial intermediaries concerning possible collusion relating to LIBOR and TIBOR reference rates and certain derivative transactions.
On 16 December 2011, the Japan Financial Services Agency (JFSA) issued an administrative action against UBS Securities Japan Ltd (UBS Securities Japan) based on findings by the Japan Securities and Exchange Surveillance Commission (SESC) that (i) a trader of UBS Securities Japan engaged in inappropriate conduct relating to Euroyen TIBOR (Tokyo Interbank Offered Rate) and Yen LIBOR, including approaching UBS AG, Tokyo Branch, and other banks to ask them to submit TIBOR rates taking into account requests from the trader for the purpose of benefiting trading positions; and (ii) serious problems in the internal controls of UBS Securities Japan resulted in its failure to detect this conduct. Based on the findings, the JFSA issued a Business SuspensionOrder requiring UBS Securities Japan to suspend trading in derivatives transactions related to Yen LIBOR and Euroyen TIBOR from 10 January 2012 to 16 January 2012 (excluding transactions required to perform existing contracts). The JFSA also issued a Business Improvement Order that requires UBS Securities Japan to (i) develop a plan to ensure compliance with its legal and regulatory obligations and to establish a control framework that is designed to prevent recurrences of the conduct identified in the JFSA’s administrative action, and (ii) provide periodic written reports to the JFSA regarding the company’s implementation of the measures required by the order. On the same day the JFSA also issued an administrative action against UBS AG, Tokyo Branch, based on a finding that an employee of the Tokyo branch “continuously received approaches” from an employee of UBS Securities Japan regarding Euroyen TIBOR rate submissions, which was determined to be an inappropriate practice that was not reported to the branch’s management. Pursuant to this administrative action, the JFSA issued an order under the Japan Banking Act which imposes requirements similar to those imposed under the Business Improvement Order directed to UBS Securities Japan.
UBS has been granted conditional leniency or conditional immunity from authorities in certain jurisdictions, including the Antitrust Division of the DOJ and WEKO, in connection with potential antitrust or competition law violations related to submissions for Yen LIBOR and Euroyen TIBOR. WEKO has also granted UBS conditional immunity in connection with potential antitrust or competition law violations related to submissions for Swiss franc LIBOR and certain transactions related to Swiss franc LIBOR. As a result of these conditional grants, we will not be subject to prosecutions, fines or other sanctions for antitrust or competition law violations in connection with the matters we reported to those authorities, subject to our continuing cooperation. However, the conditional leniency and conditional immunity grants we have received do not bar government agencies from asserting other claims against us. In addition, as a result of the conditional leniency agreement with the DOJ, we are eligible for a limit on liability to actual rather than treble damages were damages to be awarded in any civil antitrust action under US law based on conduct covered by the agreement and for relief from potential joint-and-several liability in connection with such civil antitrust action, subject to our satisfying the DOJ and the court presiding over the civil litigation of our cooperation. The conditional leniency and conditional immunity grants do not otherwise affect the ability of private parties to assert civil claims against us.
A number of putative class actions and other actions have been filed in federal courts in the US against UBS and numerous other banks on behalf of certain parties who transacted in LIBORbased derivatives. The complaints allege manipulation, through various means, of the US dollar LIBOR rate and prices of US dollar LIBOR-based derivatives in various markets. Claims for damages are asserted under various legal theories, including violations of the US Commodity Exchange Act and antitrust laws.